Author: larthurhunt

What Samuel Barkin got wrong about structuration in realism

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Samuel Barkin’s “Realism, Prediction, and Foreign Policy” (2009) makes an honest attempt at deriding contemporary political realism. In it, Barkin makes a clear case that modern realism is essentially overreaching, moving too far beyond the classical realist’s original positions on normativity, subjectivity, and policy prescription. Rather, realism as it currently stands is concerned primarily with the opposite: the deduction of objective laws and observing the deterministic nature of international structures.

At its core, Barkin’s argument asserts that there is an internal contradiction found in the neo-realist doctrine; that is, that international politics is both predictable, given the causal power of structure, and prescriptible, given the relevancy of the agent. In order to be ontologically consistent he contends that realism must respect the foremost insight of classical realism: an embracing of realism’s original reflexivity and, ultimately, using it to guide foreign policy, rather than predicting the outcome of international relations. To do both, according to Barkin, would result in doing neither very well.

Early on Barkin makes the assumption that Morgenthau’s original position recognised the complexities of the world insomuch as they interfere with the accuracy of policy prediction. This required attention to be paid to the specific context in which the actor found themselves; this lends itself directly to the practice of policy prescription, and the contours of social scientific traditionalism more broadly.

Barkin’s positive contribution relies largely on his criticism of Kenneth Waltz’ structural realism. Waltz’ neorealism is said to adopt the power politics of classical realism and apply it within a systems-theoretic framework that is, apparently, more likened to liberalism than realism due to its reliance on the logic of the “ultimate liberal institution”: the market (p. 240). Waltz denounces realism’s foundation as a theory of foreign policy, and instead considers it a theory of systemic constraints, thus endowing realism with a deterministic—and predictable—set of general expectations that undermine the value of agency and the idiosyncrasies of the state (p. 242). Barkin calls for reflexivity—or introspection—in order to reaffirm realism’s original favouring of agency over structure, judgment over determinism, and cautioned prudence over pre-calculated politics.

It is important, however, to redirect this very prudence on itself. We should be skeptical of Barkin’s narrow interpretation of structural determination. Although Barkin rests on fair assumptions in explicating the social scientific turn of classical realism, one has to consider the possibility of a compatibilist ontology within the structuralist’s framework. To that end, Barkin maintains firm opposition on the grounds that Waltz espouses a closed-off, recursive account of international systemic structures that overconfidently determines—that is, governs—state behavior. If this were true, what then, Barkin asks, is the point in making policy prescriptions?

In response, one should imagine that neorealists may in fact have good reasons for doing so, because, perhaps, structure is not the only operative factor. Waltz and Mearsheimer certainly do not dismiss the relevancy of agents. More precisely, they support a system of constraints and motivations that allow for predictions according to those “general expectations”. They do not, however, make claims to their sacrosanct application nor their causal power vis-a-vis state behavior.

This gives rise to questions regarding whether a more lenient interpretation of the role of systemic structures is actually incompatible with the classical realist ideals of reflexivity and policy prescription. Conveniently for him, Barkin has left these questions unanswered.

Reopening the struture-agency debate is a tired pseudo-metaphysical discussion that has little usefulness as a heuristic in IR. As long as international relations are the domain of human beings with material interests and material foreign policy instruments, we will continue to see agency co-determine structure. As outsiders, our job isn’t to discern these dividing lines but to colour between them.

 

 

What Samuel Barkin got wrong about structuration in realism

Abridged: toward a modular framework for integrative research in IR theory

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International relations (IR) theory as a discipline of study has both suffered from and found communicative grounding in a series of well-connected “Great Debates” between generations of conflicting theoretical schools. Presently, the crux of the fourth Debate can be summed as such: positivism versus interpretivism (sometimes conflated with “post-positivism”). In recent years, there have been a number of calls to reverse the so-called “balkanization” of the field (Colgan, 2016: 7), mostly advocating for a degree of cross-theoretical dialogue, and a pragmatic admission that both schools offer mutually enriching tools for problem solving (Price & Reut-Smit, 1996; Kowert & Shannon, 2002; Fearon & Wendt, 2002; Katzenstein, Keohane, & Krasner, 1998). At the same time, there have been counter-argumentative efforts that reify the divisions between the two predominant philosophies, pointing to certain fundamental rifts in methodology that demand consideration (Moravcsik, 1999; Mearsheimer, 1994). At the forefront of the epistemic divide are a growing school of scholars who are crafting an obscure, though earnest, conciliatory framework for bridging the rival paradigms. Borrowing from recent developments in the philosophy of social science, “critical realists” (or critical naturalists) have provided a possible catch-all epistemology that accommodates for the ontological claims from both sides of the field (Jackson, 2010; Bhaskar, Esbjorn-Hargens, Hartwig, & Hedlund, 2016). I intend to situate this emerging interface within the established canon of IR theory in such a way that it provides space for a possible détente between opposing theoretical factions. To this end, I will illustrate my solution using the concept of modular design.

In plain terms, positivism is a collection of multiple epistemological approaches that share the foundational assumptions in the efficacy of (i) data derived from empirical evidence, and (ii) its interpretation through reason and logic, as the only source of true positive knowledge (Larrain, 1979); albeit, this statement has no intention of ever “being proved” as a truth claim itself (p. 197). And here lies the crux of the debate: positivism, on the whole, relies on a Humean account of causality and a foundational claim of scientific laws as being those extracted from the empirical unification of events. These assumptive premises have been questioned as to whether they are consistent with some general “goal of understanding” (Smith, 2006: 192). Smith (2006) goes on to point out that the antithetical method employed by the interpretivist of rejecting natural or social causality contradicts their inclusion of this world in their research should it maintain any pretenses to science or ‘inquiry’ (p. 192). We can now infer that the ontological status of causality, and thus what can be known about the world in general, presents a rift between the two parties that fundamental obstructs their ability to meaningfully communicate with each other—or, in more temporal terms, there is no mid-level theory on which these epistemologies can interact.

In advancing further with respect to the positivist’s dilemma, it would be a disservice to the debate to not continue expounding its foundational difficulties. At its core, the positivist advances a causal mechanistic framework that rests upon grossly unempirical assumptions regarding “timeless necessary connections” between causal events (that is, the inextricable quality linking ∆X with ∆Y); however, to accept this as true would be to accept that nothing, in empirically verifiable terms, binds X and Y together, and the fact that “all past [X] has been [X and Y together, and the fact that “all past [Xs] have been [Ys] is a matter of cosmic coincidence” (Hildebrand, 2016: 4). This is a cogent description of David Hume’s critique of inductive reasoning which, in broad terms, posits that inductive arguments are concerned with inferential justifications from the premises; however, inductive premises are justified themselves by subjective experiences which themselves have no immediate bearing “on how the inference from that premise to the conclusion is justified” (BonJour, 2010: 53).

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Abridged: toward a modular framework for integrative research in IR theory

A Review of Shannon & Kowert (2012): Political Psychology as “Ideational Ally” of Constructivism in IR Theory

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In Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance, Shannon and Kowert (2012) present a convincing case in defense of theoretical ‘cross-fertilization’ in international relations theory. The editors reject disciplinary isolation by advocating for an embrace of psychological considerations within the methodological context of constructivism, which they contend make mutually enriching contributions to the international relations literature. In making the argument that constructivism’s material basis for identity and interest formation is essentially an incomplete model for assessing choice behavior, it follows that we must then extend our consideration to the cognitive biases, errors, and processes of the agent to come to a fuller understanding. Where constructivism is seen as a potentially useful methodological framework, political psychology can be built on top to create a synthesized, interdisciplinary approach that carefully examines not only the macro-level social structure of norms, identities, and interests, but also the micro-foundations of behavior offered by psychology. This affords us a complete package for making inferences that go beyond the limits of a stand-alone theoretical explanation.

Making the case for a “psychological-constructivism” provides a degree of usefulness with respect to descriptive mid and lower-range explanations that create space for international relations theory to take on a larger heuristic role in political studies. Constructivist methodology as espoused by Wendt (1992), for instance, makes room for the development of mid-range theories of European integration such as neofunctionalism, which holds that transfers in some domestic allegiances to a supranational entity will trigger a “spillover” effect in which state actors realize that cooperation in one industrial sector contains economic inertia for material gains in other sectors. This level of abstraction is only made possible by rejecting a steadfast commitment to the self-help doctrines and formal modelling of rationalists and instead paying greater attention to process and the “inter-subjective” experiences of state interaction (e.g. trust building). This is the contribution of Wendt’s constructivist methodology. From there, political psychology requires us to turn our attention to cognitive elements at the agent-level that may interfere with standard accounts of rational choice decision-making. These include processes internal to the decision-maker, such as emotional motivations to regionally integrate in a post-war political climate, potential linguistic and cultural impediments to multinationalism, and simple normative beliefs that may interfere with collective identity formation. This presents an additional layer of complexity for the researcher to explore if standard systems-level accounts of decision-making are proven insufficient. Indeed, they are also worth investigating in their own right.

Although conventional wisdom would suggest that the constructivist may denounce the utility of political psychology as being too individualistic, a strong dialogue between the two schools has considerable potential for theoretical hole-patching. As “ideational allies”, these perspectives can work in tandem to offer deeper insights into political phenomena. However, it remains to be seen whether the editor’s narrow description of constructivism can extend beyond the positivism that Wendt’s constructivism is wedded to. Wendt’s typology assumes empirical observation can generate logical-causal links, but this largely ignores the post-positivist epistemology that underlies the critical schools of constructivism that are emerging in the literature. These include the Neo-Marxist, postcolonial, and feminist schools that posit an inextricable link between the processes of international relations and ideas of power, class, and gender. This postmodern variant of constructivism is not so concerned with extracting causal links and falsifiable explanations as much as they are with devising explanatory narratives and a grand social ontology to guide political behavior. How political psychology may overlap with this particular brand of constructivism is unexplored in Shannon and Kowert’s volume and thus we are left with an interesting frontier for further study: the intersection of individual agency and the identity politics of the critical school.

A Review of Shannon & Kowert (2012): Political Psychology as “Ideational Ally” of Constructivism in IR Theory

How to kill a nuclear arms deal

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(Note: This article first appeared in January 19, 2016 edition of The Chronicle Herald. Find it here.)

Ironically, the Iran nuclear agreement may fail for reasons unrelated to the procurement of nuclear weapons or fissile material.

On Jan. 16 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified Iran had implemented the measures under Annex V of the agreement and had begun to apply the Additional Protocol, a more comprehensive procedure for further inspections of nuclear facilities.

In response, executive orders have revoked five rounds of U.S. sanctions and United Nations and European Union resolutions have rolled back restrictions on trade and travel. Conventional wisdom would suggest the deal is playing out as planned.

The U.S. Treasury has issued a new, seemingly unrelated round of economic sanctions in response to Iran’s Oct. 10 and Nov. 21 ballistic missile tests. The executive action targets 11 individuals and entities found responsible for supplying or supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program.

It’s no accident these developments followed immediately after the release of four American nationals held captive by the Islamic Republic.

Iran is strictly barred from testing ballistic missiles in accordance with paragraph 9 of UN Security Council Resolution 1929. Following the tests, both Hillary Clinton and the Republican congressional caucus have called for additional unilateral sanctions against Iran.

Tehran officials deny their medium-range Emad missile-launch defied UN regulations, saying it was never designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

According to a confidential report by the Security Council’s panel of experts, the Emad missile, a variation of the Shahab-3, is fully capable of delivering a nuclear warhead.

The Iran deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), lifts all sanctions imposed on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for heavy restrictions on its enrichment infrastructure and stringent inspections by the UN’s nuclear watchdog.

Framed as a “political agreement”, the JCPOA is not a signed treaty and does not have force of law. This makes the JCPOA — an agreement closely tied to nuclear proliferation and international security— nothing more than a handshake deal at the mercy of the parties’ whims.

It remains to be seen whether the Obama administration’s landmark foreign policy achievement will come to fruition. The agreement was forged out of political convenience and can be broken the same way.

Iran perceives the new round of sanctions as a violation of the spirit of the agreement and as lacking legitimacy. If Iran responds by resuming enrichment of weapons-grade uranium, the entire diplomatic effort will fall through as UN sanctions snap back.

Before this happens, the claimant would have to refer the accusation to the joint commission, a dispute resolution body mandated with notifying the Security Council in cases of noncompliance within 30 days of a matter arising. The Security Council then has an additional 30 days to pass a resolution on the issue.

By the time the dust settles, Iran would have likely reaped a substantial economic injection from temporary access to foreign markets.

The fundamental difference in interpretation lies in the fact that the UNSC, composed of five of the seven JCPOA signatories, views development of Iran’s missile program as a basic element of the deal. From Iran’s perspective, they’re not connected.

Iran perceives the U.S. as failing to honour the obligation to keep sanctions withdrawn. The Iranian elite have a convenient opportunity to score domestic political sympathy by framing the narrative as American non-compliance.

Tehran has the option of reneging on its commitments in light of the new sanctions. The question is whether Iran has worthwhile motivation after the Rial booms and the Middle East is awash with Iranian oil.

How to kill a nuclear arms deal